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## DECEMBER MEETING.

THE stated meeting was held on Thursday, the 14th instant, at three o'clock, P.M., Mr. LORD in the chair.

The record of the last meeting was read and approved.

The Librarian reported the following accessions:

From Paul Dana, of New York, through Prof. Charles Sprague Sargent, the papers of Col. Winthrop Sargent, of Gloucester, Mass., a Corresponding Member of this Society from 1794 to 1820, showing his connection with Rufus Putnam and Manasseh Cutler, the settlement at Marietta, his own services as Surveyor-General of the proposed territory in 1786, as Secretary in 1787, and later as acting Governor in the absence of Governor St. Clair; also letters received while he was Governor of the Mississippi Territory, 1798-1801. These papers, running from 1771 to 1820, contain letters from Gen. Henry Knox, Robert Morris, Rufus King, and many others prominent in the affairs of the period.

From Mrs. Archibald Hopkins, of Washington, D. C., by deposit, through our associate Rev. Mr. Frothingham, that portion of the Edward Everett correspondence which is in her possession, running from 1814 to 1865, with letters relating to the same from 1907 to 1920 and some printed material.

From Miss Clara Bertha Dobson, of Ipswich, Mass., papers of her grandfather, Lemuel Shattuck, the historian of Concord, Mass., and a Resident Member of this Society, consisting of a copy of his autobiography, 1844, and letters to his brother Daniel, at Concord, 1816-1835, written from Albany and Troy, N. Y., and Detroit, Mich., where he taught school.

From Dr. Algernon Coolidge, a number of rare maps, showing battle-grounds and other places in America during the War for Independence; also a pencil sketch of an old house and grounds on Purchase Street, and certificates of membership of his father, Dr. Algernon Coolidge, in German Societies in 1850 and 1855.

From Miss Emma Rodman, a passport issued to Samuel W. Rodman, Washington, March 25, 1836.

From Leonard F. Austin, of Providence, R. I., several tax lists of the Independent Christian Society of Gloucester, Mass., 1790-1840, with a letter to Rev. John Murray, minister of the Uni-

versalist Church there, which was established in 1779; also two rare tracts printed in 1785,<sup>1</sup> and copies of letters relating to this Church, April, 1776.

By purchase, a common-place book written by Benjamin Franklin (1650-1727), an uncle of Dr. Franklin, which has been printed by the Colonial Society of Massachusetts; also an account-book kept by Benjamin Stockbridge, of Scituate, as shoemaker and miller, 1705 to 1729; and notes of his son Dr. Benjamin Stockbridge on alchemy. Also four folio pages of an account-book of a Boston merchant, 1702-1709, 1714, 1715, and the second volume of a diary kept by Edmund Quincy, Jr., at Dedham, April 28 to November 2, 1852.

From Dr. Frederick C. Shattuck, papers of his grandfather, Dr. George Shattuck, 1848-1853.

From Mr. John W. Farwell, a map showing the burnt district of Boston, 1872, issued by the Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Company in 1876.

From the Estate of Miss Georgina Lowell, a large paper copy of Edmund F. Slafter's *Sir William Alexander and American Colonization*, extended with many illustrations.

From Harold Murdock, three Massachusetts broadsides: The Bloody Butchery by the British Troops at Concord, April 19, 1775; one on the Battle of Bunker Hill; and In Provincial Congress, Cambridge, February 14, 1775, resolves recommending a review of the several regiments in the Province, and a return of their condition to Congress.

From Grenville H. Norcross, a pastoral eulogy, "The Tears of Friendship," composed by Nathaniel Sigourney on the death of Miss Polly Webb, Boston, September 12, 1792, written on a large piece of parchment by William Jenks.

### The Cabinet-Keeper reported the following gifts:

From Harold Murdock, a pencil drawing of Tremont Street, as it appeared in 1800, from Hamilton Place to Boylston Street, made by George M. Woodward, July, 1864, from the recollections of Dr. Solomon Davis Townsend. A like drawing by the same

<sup>1</sup> An | Appeal | to the | impartial Public | by | The Society of | Christian Independents, | congregating in | Glocester. | Boston, | Printed by Benjamin Edes & Son, | No. 42, Cornhill. | M,DCC,LXXXV. By Epes Sargent. An | Answer | to | a Piece, | entitled, | "An Appeal | to the | impartial Publick, | By an Association," | Calling Themselves | "Christian Independents, in Glocester," | Massachusetts: | Printed and sold by S. Hall, in Salem. | MDCCCLXXXV.

artist, drawn in 1865, is in the office of the City Registrar, City Hall, Boston, and also gives another section of Tremont Street, from School Street to Hamilton Place, and a third, representing Boylston Street from Tremont to Carver Street. These were photographed, greatly reduced, by John A. Whipple and copyrighted in 1866, and the two Tremont Street sections were reproduced in the *Bulletin* of the Boston Public Library, October, 1894. The Murdock drawing is earlier in date and shows differences in minor but not in essential details.

From Lemuel A. Welles, of New York, a photograph of an original daguerreotype of Daniel Webster in his possession.

From the estate of Miss Mary Perkins Quincy, of Litchfield, Conn., a miniature of John Williams Quincy, Senior, her grandfather, copied from an oil portrait said to have been painted about 1788.

From Dr. John W. Farlow, a photograph of the Massachusetts Horticultural Society building on Tremont Street, corner of Bromfield, in 1880.

From William Green Shillaber, a large photograph of the Friday Club, 1855, by Hawes, showing portraits of Chief Justice Shaw, C. P. Curtis, Thomas Motley, Nathan Hale, B. R. Curtis, George Hayward, James K. Mills, Francis C. Gray, Nathan Appleton, Charles H. Warren, William Sturgis, Thomas Ward, and T. B. Curtis.

From Dr. Samuel J. Mixter, a sketch of the common at Athol, Massachusetts, by M. E. C.

From Miss Alice W. Pearce, of Roxbury, through Joseph Morrell, of Dedham, a photograph of a portrait of John Langdon (1722-1783), by Merchant of Boston, owned by Langdon Pearce of Winnetka, Illinois, and painted by John Greenwood.

From Miss Emma Rodman, a lithographic view of Round Hill School, Northampton; a lithograph of Miss Fanny Kemble; and a mourning badge in memory of William Henry Harrison.

From Albert D. Bosson, an engraving of the Boston Exchange Coffee House, by A. Bowen; and an impression of Thomas Pownall's view of Boston, which appeared in Drake's *History of Boston*.

From Miss A. C. Storer, of Newport, R. I., 460 coins and medals, some medical and others relating to Rhode Island.

From W. K. Flint, 800 modern coins.

From Delano Wight, eight people's money bills of 1880.

From Dr. Storer, eleven presidential medals.

The Editor, for the Corresponding Secretary, reported the receipt of a letter from Philip Hale accepting his election as a Resident Member of the Society, and one from Clarence Walworth Alvord accepting his election as a Corresponding Member.

Mr. NORCROSS gave a note on

GEORGE LATIMER

The first fugitive slave seized by his former owner in Boston was George Latimer on October 21, 1842. He was confined without legal process in Leverett Street jail, and was finally bought by Rev. Nathaniel Colver, of Tremont Temple, and set free. This seizure caused great excitement in Boston and a committee for his defense was formed and a tri-weekly paper called *The Latimer Journal and North Star*, edited by Dr. Henry I. Bowditch, William Francis Channing and Frederick S. Cabot, was issued from November 11, 1842, to May 16, 1843. On October 28, 1842, Latimer sent to the Boston ministers a letter asking that prayers for his release might be offered on the following Sunday. I recently obtained, and now give to the Society, the letter sent to Rev. William Jenks of the Green Street church (formerly a member of this Society and the grandfather of Rev. Henry F. Jenks, our late member). It is in the handwriting of Samuel E. Sewall, whom several of us remember, and the signature of Latimer (by his mark) is witnessed by him.

George Latimer, a man created free by his Maker, and who believes himself free under the laws of Virginia, being now imprisoned in the Boston Jail by James B. Gray who claims him as a slave, requests an interest in your prayers, that he may be released from his unrighteous imprisonment, and preserved from the sufferings he may be called to endure if reduced to slavery.

his  
GEO. X LATIMER  
mark

Witness: S. E. SEWALL.

Leverett St. Jail, Oct. 28, 1842.

(Addressed) Rev. Dr. Jenks, or the officiating clergyman Green St.

Dr. Jenks has endorsed on the letter "Rec<sup>d</sup> & read (with a few curtailments) L<sup>d</sup>'s day, Oct. 30th, 1842."

It would be interesting to know what words he omitted in reading the letter from his pulpit.

I also give two printed circulars of the Latimer committees (October 27 and December 8, 1842) sent to Dr. Jenks asking for aid financially as well as by prayer. A full account of the Latimer case is in the *Life of Henry I. Bowditch*, I. 133.

The following communication from Mr. RUGG, who was unable to be present, was read:

#### THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Recently it became necessary to investigate the history and power of the office of Attorney General. Of course resort was had to the admirable article by Mr. A. C. Goodell, Jr., in 2 *Proceedings* of the Massachusetts Historical Society, x. 285-291, both inclusive. The statement there made, that Benjamin Bullivant, was appointed Attorney General at a date uncertain but before July 1, 1686, and sworn in July 26, 1686, has been generally accepted as true. Reference is made to Bullivant in John Dunton's *Letters from New England* (Prince Society), 94, as a physician and pharmacist. It was suggested by Mr. John Henry Edmonds, Chief of the Archives Division of the Commonwealth, that a search of the records now accessible, and not easily available to Mr. Goodell, might reveal an earlier appointment; therefore, under the immediate direction of Mr. John F. Cronin, Clerk of the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, and of Mr. Edmonds, a careful search was made of records at the State House, at the Boston Athenaeum, and of Suffolk County court files. The only record revealed thereby was in Suffolk County court files — No. 1857, Council record of 1680. It is to the effect that on April 29, 1680, Anthony Checkley was elected, by the Council, Attorney General. A photostatic copy of that record is transmitted herewith. Expressed in print its words are these:

Att A meeting of the Counil. held at Boston 29. April 80

\* \* \* \*

It is Ordered that m<sup>r</sup> Anthony checkley is Appointed Attorney

Generall to prosecute & Implead at the Court of Assistants on the Adjournment of y<sup>e</sup> Court Assistants on. y<sup>e</sup> 1st wednesday after y<sup>e</sup> Election: Elizabeth Morse presented by y<sup>e</sup> Grand Jury for a witch: and that the Secretary m<sup>r</sup> Addington and said m<sup>r</sup> Checkley is Appointed to pvse (peruse) the evidences now in Court & what they Judge necessary. to be sent for w<sup>h</sup> such othe<sup>r</sup> as m<sup>r</sup> woodbridge or any there Cann: procure & show necessary to put as litle charge to y<sup>e</sup> Country as may be: & y<sup>t</sup> y<sup>e</sup> Secretary Issue out his warrants Accordingly for all persons & to y<sup>e</sup> keep<sup>r</sup> of y<sup>e</sup> prison at Ipswich to bring hir Doune at y<sup>e</sup> time. E R R

The initials are those of Edward Rawson, Secretary of the Council and Court of Assistants.

Although the appointment was for a specified purpose and a limited period, yet the title of the office is unmistakable. Thus it appears that the first Attorney General was appointed six years and two months earlier than hitherto has been supposed. The results of this investigation are summarized in *Commonwealth v. Kozlowsky*, 238 Mass. 379, at 385. It seems, from the list of Mr. Goodell, that Anthony Checkley again was Attorney General by election on June 4, 1689, and also by appointment under the Province Charter on October 28, 1692.

In this connection record No. 975 in the Suffolk Court files is of interest: "Att a County Court held at Boston 26<sup>th</sup> 5 <sup>o</sup>/<sub>m</sub> 1670 M<sup>r</sup> Richard Callicott is Ordered & hereby impowred to be Attourney for the Court at the Next Court of Assistants in what case or cases Criminal have appealed from the Judgm<sup>t</sup> of this Court. This is a True Coppie as Attests Free Grace Bendall Clerk." Manifestly this is not the appointment of an Attorney General. It is made by the County court and not by the body which would appoint or elect an officer with jurisdiction throughout the colony. His tenure of office is limited to a single sitting or term of court. Moreover, his duties are restricted to the cases appealed from the County court of Suffolk County. His duties are such as in later days have been conferred upon district attorneys. Although not so named, this would seem to be the earliest appearance in the Commonwealth of a District Attorney or of an officer exercising his functions. So far as I am aware, the first reference to the office of



District Attorney in the statutes is St. 1807, c. 18. There is ground for argument that, from the words of that statute, possibly a previous existence of the office of District Attorney may be inferred. I do not know of any evidence of the appointment of a District Attorney or of the performance of the duties of that office by any one except this Suffolk record. Search of the early court records of other counties may disclose similar appointments by the court. Such search would involve great labor. I do not know of tradition or report bearing upon the point.

Captain FROTHINGHAM read a paper on

#### THE CRISIS OF THE CIVIL WAR — ANTIETAM

The Manassas campaign from the north of Richmond had been approved by Secretary Stanton and General Halleck, the new Commander-in-Chief of the Army, because both were swayed by the obsession, so harmful throughout the Civil War, for restricting the use of our troops to regions "where they could at the same time cover Washington and operate against Richmond." This was the stock phrase at the time. Following this line of doctrine, troops had been kept away from the only logical base, on the James River, and an army given to General Pope for an operation against Richmond from the north.

Pope's operation was a failure from the start. The Northern commander had an ample superiority in numbers (Manassas and Chantilly — Union effectives engaged 75,696, Confederates effectives engaged 48,527),<sup>1</sup> but he showed no ability to handle his troops. Pope was also in a daze as to the whereabouts and movements of his enemy. As a natural result, he was outmanœuvred, outfought, and badly beaten in the Second Manassas campaign — with his defeated army in full retreat to Washington in the last days of August.

After his army had left the Peninsula McClellan had been ordered to Alexandria, where he was kept in a strange anomalous position, with no definite command, but deluged with puzzling telegrams from Halleck, who was breaking

<sup>1</sup> *Numbers and Losses.* Livermore, U. S. A.

down under his responsibility for Pope's campaign. General Halleck's telegraphic dispatches throughout his command of the army, are amazing confessions of his incapacity,<sup>1</sup> but at this time he was at his worst on account of his bewilderment as to the real situation of Pope's Army, for which he had made himself responsible.

After the event, Halleck tried to shift some of the blame for Pope's failure to McClellan, by claiming that Franklin's Corps should have been sent earlier to Pope by McClellan. But, among the vacillations of Halleck's telegrams, it is clear that the final order to move Franklin was not given until the evening of August 28<sup>2</sup>—much too late to be of any help to Pope. Beside this, the following telegram of August 29, from Halleck to McClellan, disposes of any claim that Halleck intended Franklin to make a rapid advance to Pope: "I want Franklin's corps to go far enough to find out something about the enemy. Perhaps he may get such information at Anandale as to prevent his going farther." No other evidence is needed to show Halleck's helpless state of mind, and this man had been made Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army.

All doubt is removed, as to the status of General McClellan at this time, by a significant telegram from President Lincoln himself, of the same date (August 29, 1862), "... but I wish not to control. That I leave to Gen. Halleck aided by your counsels."<sup>3</sup> This telegram shows that McClellan had been relegated to the position of merely being an adviser for General Halleck.

General Halleck hopelessly collapsed under the strain August 31, and late that night he sent the following pathetic dispatch to McClellan (August 31, 1862, 10.07 P.M.): "I beg of you to assist me in this crisis with your ability and experience. I am entirely tired out." In his diary, Chase bitterly called this "Halleck's surrender to McClellan." McClellan went at once to Washington and reported at Halleck's office the next morning (September 1, 1862).

<sup>1</sup> "In the first place, General Halleck's deficiencies as a general-in-chief are everywhere painfully apparent. It is plain that he had no definite policy of his own."—Ropes.

<sup>2</sup> Halleck to McClellan, 8.40 P.M. C. W., I. 461.

<sup>3</sup> C. W., I. 464.

McClellan found Halleck in great confusion, between optimistic reports from Pope and persistent rumors of defeat. McClellan gave his reasons for thinking that things were going badly, and he urged upon Halleck the advisability of sending someone of his staff to get a reliable report of the condition of affairs. McClellan, with much difficulty, induced Halleck to send out his Adjutant General Kelton on this errand.

The report of this able officer was most alarming, as it was evident there had been a disaster for Pope's Army, and that night Halleck realized the threatening situation. This resulted in one of the most dramatic events of the war. President Lincoln himself fearlessly took control of the situation. The next morning (September 2) the President and General Halleck called upon General McClellan while he was at breakfast. This interview was typical of the greatness of Lincoln. The President, with characteristic sincerity, told McClellan that Pope was utterly defeated, that Pope's army was retreating in confusion, that he looked upon Washington as lost, and he asked McClellan if "under the circumstances" he would resume command of the army.

McClellan without hesitation accepted the task, and tried in vain to reassure Lincoln and Halleck as to the danger of the capture of Washington. The President then verbally placed McClellan in command,<sup>1</sup> and the extraordinary interview thus ended in Lincoln's giving, on his own responsibility, the command of what proved to be the decisive campaign of the Civil War. The spirit of McClellan's acceptance of this high duty was worthy of the confidence shown by Lincoln at this fateful crisis.

The written order for McClellan's command in the ensuing campaign was as follows: "Maj. Gen. McClellan will have command of the fortifications of Washington and of all the troops for the defense of the capital. By order of Maj. Gen. Halleck." (September 2, 1862.) The reinstated General<sup>2</sup> at once rode out, and met the retreating army.

<sup>1</sup> "The President on his own responsibility once more charged Gen. McClellan with the defense of the capital."—Irwin, U. S. A.

<sup>2</sup> "McClellan, informally reinstated by unspoken verdict of army and people alike."—Dodge, U. S. A.

He was welcomed everywhere with cheering and enthusiasm.<sup>1</sup> The immediate effect of his presence was a proof of McClellan's personal hold upon the army.<sup>2</sup> As fast as the different commands came in, he assigned them to stations, and before morning all confusion was at an end.

General Pope ceased to exist as an element in the military situation after the following order from Halleck (September 5): "Maj. Gen. Pope, Arlington: The Armies of the Potomac and Virginia being consolidated, you will report for orders to the Secretary of War."

In the first place, when considering the military situation on September 2, when President Lincoln gave the command to McClellan after Pope's defeat, it must be realized that the panic in Washington among the officials of the Administration went even to the extent of preparations for the evacuation of Washington. This is shown beyond doubt by Chase's Diary and other records of Lincoln's Cabinet. Ropes states: "The Secretary of War ordered a large part of the contents of the arsenal to be shipped to New York," and Gideon Welles records that Stanton and Halleck were "filled with apprehension beyond the others." This must be recognized as the attitude of the War Department and Cabinet, from which President Lincoln had broken away in boldly giving the command to McClellan.

On the other hand, it is also equally well established that, from the time of taking the command, on September 2 as described, McClellan was not infected by this prevailing fear for the safety of Washington. On the contrary, it is evident that, from the first, McClellan had divined Lee's real plan of crossing the Potomac and invading Maryland. This was proved beyond any question by the fact that McClellan, on September 3, the very next day after he had been given the command, had ordered three army corps (2d and 12th to Tenallytown, 9th to 7th Street Road near Washington) to operate against a Confederate invasion of Northern territory.

President Lincoln's drastic action was thus at once vin-

<sup>1</sup> Comte de Paris, etc. "The scene that followed can be more easily imagined than described. From extreme sadness we passed in a twinkling to a delirium of delight." — *Battles and Leaders*, II. 550.

<sup>2</sup> "The restoration of this brilliant soldier seemed to have imparted new life to that army." — Gordon, C. S. A.

dictated by McClellan's immediate perception of Lee's actual plan of an invasion of the North, instead of an attack upon Washington as feared by the Cabinet, and McClellan's correct solution of the problem of Lee's real intention was all important for the success of the Union cause.

Thus promptly McClellan started the Northern Army on the only way that would lead to the defeat of Lee's invasion, and the credit of pursuing this way must be given to McClellan alone, as he was constantly deluged with telegrams from Halleck to call him back.

The campaign that followed, Lee's first invasion, was the most dangerous threat against the North of the whole war. In fact, it was the only offensive undertaken by the Confederates with chances of success. The greatness of the danger was not realized until long after the war, and what was at stake for the Union, outside of the operations in the field, is not even at the present time generally understood.

The details of Lee's plans are now known. General Walker's description of his interview with Lee at the outset of the campaign,<sup>1</sup> quotes Lee's own words (September 6):

In ten days from now, if the military situation is what I confidently expect it to be after the capture of Harper's Ferry, I shall concentrate my army at Hagerstown, effectively destroy the Baltimore and Ohio Road, and march to this point," placing his finger at Harrisburg, Penn. "That is the object of the campaign. You remember, no doubt, the long bridge over the Susquehanna, a few miles west of Harrisburg. Well, I wish effectively to destroy that bridge, which will disable the Pennsylvania Railroad for a long time. With the Baltimore and Ohio in our possession, and the Pennsylvania Railroad broken up, there will remain to the enemy but one route of connection with the west, and that very circuitous by way of the Lakes. After that I can turn my attention to Philadelphia, Baltimore, or Washington as may seem for our interests.

General Walker naturally showed his astonishment at this far-reaching plan, and Lee went on to speak of McClellan, saying: "He is an able general but a very cautious one. His enemies think him too much so. His army is in a very demoralized and chaotic condition, and will not be prepared

<sup>1</sup> Walker, C. S. A., — *Battles and Leaders*.

for offensive operations — or he will not think it so — for three or four weeks. Before this time I hope to be on the Susquehanna.”

Yet, at the very time Lee was telling his general that McClellan would give him a start of “three or four weeks,” which would insure the success of the invasion, McClellan was putting his army in motion to repel Lee, and this spelled the ruin of the Confederacy. As Childe, the nephew and biographer of Lee, expressed it, “All hope of seeing this magnificent project realized vanished before the rapid march and prompt attack of McClellan.”

A study of the map will show the far-reaching danger of this plan of General Lee for invading the North and cutting the most important lines of communication. The physical damage to the whole Federal military structure would have been a disaster. There can be no doubt in this respect. But in addition to all this, another grave danger impended if the Confederate invasion had been successful. This was the one time in the Civil War when there was an actual threat of recognition of the Confederacy by Great Britain, and Southern victory in this campaign of September 1862 was a bid for recognition by Great Britain, and also by the French Empire as a matter of course.

From the first, Lee himself had always maintained that European assistance was necessary to win independence for the Southern Confederacy. His biographer, Long, quotes General Lee unmistakably in this regard: “I have never believed we could, against the gigantic combination for our subjugation, make good, in the long run, our independence, unless foreign powers should directly or indirectly assist us.”

Acting upon this conviction, General Lee resolved to make his invasion of the North a bid for European recognition of the independence of the Southern Confederacy. General Lee felt perfect confidence that his invasion would gain a great Confederate victory on Northern soil, and the Southern General wrote to the Confederate President Davis<sup>1</sup> inviting him to join the army — in the words of Longstreet — General Lee’s “deliberate and urgent advice to President Davis to join him and he prepared to make a proposal for

<sup>1</sup> *Rebellion Records*, xix. Pt. II. 600.

peace and independence from the head of a conquering army."

Lee thought that such a proclamation from the Confederate President, published on Northern territory, would bring about recognition of the independence of the Southern Confederacy, with the inevitable result that European nations would "directly or indirectly assist" the South. This result was eagerly desired by General Lee and he thus made it an important part of his military plan.

The following extract from the biography of Judah P. Benjamin, the Confederate Secretary of State, will show how well founded were these hopes of General Lee.<sup>1</sup>

The Authorities in Richmond were heartily in accord with Lee, and, inspired by his confidence, Davis prepared to take the field. . . . The British press considered the Federal cause hopeless, and Lord Palmerston was writing to Lord Russell that the Yankees had "got a very complete smashing," and that, in the probable event of the capture of Baltimore and Washington, the time seemed to have come when his government and France should "address the contending parties and recommend an arrangement on the basis of a separation."

"I agree with you," replied Russell, "that the time has come for offering mediation to the United States government with a view to the recognition of the independence of the Confederates," . . . and Russell advised this course in any event. The more cautious Palmerston replied that "in case the Federal Army again met defeat," then would be the time to act, but if not, "We may await awhile and see what may follow." . . .

What followed was the news of the great battle of Sharpsburg or Antietam, and the checking of General Lee. Though it was not a very costly defeat, the prime object of his campaign had been lost and he must seek safety on his own side of the Potomac.<sup>2</sup>

Lee's retreat into Virginia changed the situation at once. Instead of being regarded as a victorious nation the South became again a part of the United States in revolt, in spite of the zeal of the Confederate sympathizers in England.

<sup>1</sup> Butler, *Judah P. Benjamin*. "The Confederate emissaries in London had access to excellent sources of information; far better, indeed, than those at the command of Mr. Adams." Charles Francis Adams, *C. F. Adams*.

<sup>2</sup> Butler, *Judah P. Benjamin*. See C. F. Adams, *A Crisis in Downing Street, Proceedings*, XLVII. 372.

For, most important of all in moral effect upon Great Britain, the victory in the Antietam campaign had put the President of the United States in a position to issue the Emancipation Proclamation (September 22, 1862), which at once justified the Northern cause in the eyes of a great part of the British public, although at first there were bitter outbursts against the proclamation throughout the British press.

The followers of Bright, Cobden, and Forster, who had stood by the Union in spite of the cotton famine, would not have been able to stand up against a successful Confederate invasion of the North; but, with the Southern army driven back into Virginia, and with the Emancipation Proclamation before the eyes of the British public, it was an entirely different situation.<sup>1</sup> In answer to Gladstone's speech in favor of the Confederacy, a member of the Palmerston-Russell ministry, Sir George Cornewall Lewis, pointed out in a speech at a public meeting at Hereford, October 14, 1862, that: "It could not be said the Southern States of the Union had *de facto* established their independence," and that they were not in a position to be recognized.

In September, when Palmerston and Russell were confident of an approaching Confederate victory, a Cabinet meeting had actually been called for October 23, with the definite purpose of considering the recognition of the Confederacy. But to quote from the biography of Benjamin again, "The Cabinet meeting was postponed, and with it the question of Southern independence." This "postponement" was forever! The opportunity was lost, for never again was the Confederacy able to take the offensive with hopes of victory.

The Southern account then says that, after Lee's defeat, the American Minister was at last in a strong enough position to intimate "indirectly" <sup>2</sup> that recognition of the Confederacy meant breaking off diplomatic relations.<sup>3</sup> The

<sup>1</sup> "Meanwhile Lincoln, taking advantage of it in the same way that the Confederates had hoped to do, had issued his Proclamation of Emancipation." — Butler, *Judah P. Benjamin*.

<sup>2</sup> Butler, *Judah P. Benjamin*.

<sup>3</sup> Mr. Adams got to the "real object in the interview": "If I had entirely trusted to the construction given by the public to a late speech, I should have begun to think of packing my carpet bags and trunks." — Charles Francis Adams.

Palmerston and Russell Ministry saw plainly that the tide had turned, and recognition of the Confederacy was no longer a part of their policy. In the words of the organ of the disappointed Confederate agents: "Therefore the ministry does nothing, because nothing is the only thing which the different sections will agree to do."

A son of Charles Francis Adams, the American Minister to England, confirms the Southern version in every particular, as will be seen from the following extracts: <sup>1</sup>

The *Alabama* sailed for Liverpool on July 29, 1862, just after McClellan's reverses in the Peninsula, and on September 14 London heard the news of the Second Battle of Bull Run. Taking these disasters together, it seemed, in Europe, as probable that the North had been overcome, and Lord Palmerston inclined to think that Washington must fall. On this supposition he wrote to Lord Russell that it might be judicious "to recommend an arrangement upon the basis of separation." Lord Russell waited a few days to see what would happen, and then replied that "whether the Federal army is destroyed or not," Great Britain should "recognize the Southern States as an independent state," and should arm Canada accordingly.

In September, 1862, the Northern fortunes fell to their lowest point, and conversely, the aggressive temper of England culminated. Lord Palmerston's view fluctuated with the fluctuation of the war, like a barometer. . . . On September 17 McClellan won the victory of Antietam. Instantly, while Lord Palmerston cooled, Lord Russell took to equivocation. . . . Meanwhile the proposition which Lord Palmerston had made to Lord Russell touching intervention remained to come before the Cabinet, and on October 2, in reply to a letter from Earl Russell, Lord Palmerston wrote that had the South continued its successes against the North, mediation might have been opportune, but that recently those successes had been checked. Therefore it would be wise to wait. . . . On October 23 the Cabinet met . . . but that day Lord Palmerston's opinion prevailed, and nothing was done. . . .

Nor did Gladstone stand alone in recognizing that the onset of the English aristocracy had collapsed with the repulse of Lee at Antietam. By a subtle instinct all Europe and America became conscious of a change of status. It was the United States now which pressed on England, not England on the United States. The dates fit with an astonishing precision. . . .

<sup>1</sup> Brooks Adams.

Hitherto Mr. Adams' work had been chiefly defensive. . . . He had indeed made energetic remonstrances in regard to the escape of both the *Florida* and the *Alabama*, but in neither case had he gone so far as to put a pressure, even verging on coercion, upon England to do her duty. He reached that point on the day when Great Britain admitted to herself that she dared not strike the North after a victory.

In the meantime the Emancipation Proclamation was taking a stronger hold on the British public, and the "Exeter Hall influence"<sup>1</sup> had grown too important for any Ministry to challenge. Yancy complained that, from this time in Great Britain, the question became merely one of "internal politics,"<sup>2</sup> and the attempt of Slidell to organize a demonstration for recognition in the House of Commons in 1863 was a dismal failure. In fact, never after Antietam was there a chance for recognition. Consequently, we must realize that the victory of Antietam not only ended the power of the friends of the Confederacy in Great Britain, but it also gave the control to Bright, Cobden and Forster, the friends of the Union.

This phase of the situation has not been sufficiently realized. It was true that the real friends of the North in Great Britain would have continued to oppose recognition of the Southern Confederacy, but, as has been shown, it is now established that the friends of the South had become even strong enough to influence the British Cabinet. After the event, it was all very well to assume that the friends of the Union would have been strong enough to block the recognition of the South by Great Britain. But it is another thing to think of what might have happened, if Lee's plan had succeeded and the Confederate army had reached the Susquehanna, with the Confederate President asking for "independence from the head of a conquering army," as had been arranged by Lee.

Knowing these possibilities, we must recognize that in September, 1862, the crisis was real and imminent. In America our physical military danger never was so great in the Civil War, and in Great Britain the friends of the

<sup>1</sup> *Life and Times of W. L. Yancy.*

<sup>2</sup> C. F. Adams, *Charles Francis Adams.*

South were at their strongest, with a definite plan for recognition and great influence in the British Cabinet. The Northern victory at Antietam unmistakably turned the scale<sup>1</sup> — and forever.

If one stops to consider what success or failure in this campaign meant to the North and the South, it will be easy to realize that it actually was the crisis of the Civil War when Lee invaded Maryland. In the words of the Benjamin biography: "Here was the critical moment for the Confederacy both in its military affairs and in its hopes of Great Britain's recognition."

This issue at stake in Europe, in addition to the military results in America, must be kept constantly in mind when studying the Antietam campaign.. Success in this invasion of the North meant a disastrous cutting of the most important Federal communications, with far-reaching results that must have followed. It must also be admitted that there was a strong influence in the existing British Cabinet to respond to a successful Southern invasion of the North by formal recognition of the Southern Confederacy. Consequently success for the South meant a double victory, in America and in Great Britain. Conversely, the repulse of the invasion by the Federal forces, that drove back the Southern army into its own territory, meant the end of both these hopes for the South, and in fact the end of any hopes of Confederate victory, as the Emancipation Proclamation was also a result of the defeat of Lee's invasion, and this put the Northern cause on a winning basis. Of course all this was not apparent at the time, and even to this day has not been clearly set forth in any history of the Civil War.

With such great dangers impending, McClellan's decision to take the army into the field against Lee's invasion was the most momentous of the war; especially when we remember that McClellan's command was only given for the defense of Washington, and the War Department could not be persuaded to believe McClellan was right in maintaining that Lee would invade Maryland.

As has been explained, Lee entered the campaign of

<sup>1</sup> "Unknowingly, and with the narrowest possible margin of safety, the crisis had been passed." — C. F. Adams, *Charles Francis Adams*.

Antietam with high hopes for the Confederate cause. He knew the great results that would inevitably follow a Southern victory, and he was confident that McClellan would not be able to get the defeated Union Army in hand in time to oppose the Confederate invasion.

Jackson's advance force of the Confederate invading army crossed the Potomac into Maryland, September 5, 1862, using the fords near Leesburg. Jackson was to capture Harper's Ferry, and then rejoin Lee's army, following the plan of invasion which has been given. Lee's main army also crossed the Potomac, and on September 8 was near Fredericksburg, Maryland.

From this place, never imagining that there was any danger of a movement against him, General Lee on September 8 issued his proclamation "To the People of Maryland," urging them to make common cause with his army. On the same day he had sent his letter to President Davis urging him to join the Confederate Army on Northern soil. Lee was supremely confident of the results here and abroad, and did not think a Union offensive was possible.

Yet, what Lee thought impossible, McClellan actually accomplished. Not only was McClellan able to move the Union troops into an unexpected offensive, but the Northern General began this offensive before Lee had any time at all to carry out his ambitious project.

As we have seen, McClellan, the very day after being given the command (September 3), had promptly ordered the 2d, 9th, and 12th corps north of the Potomac, ready to act against an invasion of the North. McClellan added to these the 1st and 6th corps and Couch's division of the 4th corps, with Pleasonton's division of cavalry to cover the advance, and on September 7 this entire force was on the march to oppose Lee. This fact was so utterly contrary to all Confederate calculations, that the Southern leaders were not able to conceal their astonishment, after the event. As Longstreet expressed it: "At this very time (September 8) the recently displaced commander, General McClellan, reinstated in command, was marching for an opportunity to recover his good name." The one possible move was being made that meant a double defeat for Lee's far-reaching plans — defeat in America and defeat in Europe.

But, it must be kept in mind, so far was the Administration from realizing the situation, that throughout the Antietam campaign McClellan was showered with telegrams from Halleck, telling him that Lee's move was a feint to draw him from Washington.<sup>1</sup>

It was most fortunate for the Union cause that McClellan did not allow himself to be held back by this constant misinformation from the War Department, nor was he diverted from his one object of placing his army in front of Lee's Army. Keeping the Potomac on his left flank, he moved steadily to this end, without hesitation or indecision. He marched by easy stages to refresh his troops, reorganizing his army on the march. This added difficulty of reorganizing the defeated Union army must be fully understood. As the Count of Paris expressed it, "McClellan had undertaken a colossal task."

McClellan's accomplishment of this task is summed up in the statement of fact, that he forced the passes of the Blue Ridge Mountains September 14, and was able to interpose the Union army in front of Lee before the Confederate General could get his whole army in hand. Not only this, but Lee was caught in such a cramped position that he was unable to manœuvre. When Lee was thus pinned down to a premature set battle, the whole military and political scheme of the Confederacy was defeated — and this sums up the essential of the whole campaign.

There is no question of the fact that the sudden appearance of McClellan's army was a bolt from the blue for the Confederates. The unmistakable Southern testimony, that Jackson himself could not believe McClellan's army was there in force, is tribute enough to McClellan's unexpected movement. "The trouble was that Jackson could not be

<sup>1</sup> Halleck, U. S. A., to McClellan, U. S. A.: Sept. 9. "the enemy's object to draw off the mass of our forces, and then to attack from the Virginia side of the Potomac." Sept. 11. "I think the main force of the enemy is in your front." Sept. 13. "The enemy will send a small column toward Pennsylvania, so as to draw off your forces, then suddenly move on Washington." Sept. 14. "Scouts report a large force still on the Virginia side—I fear you are exposing your left flank, and that the enemy can cross in your rear." Sept. 16. "I fear now more than ever that they will recross and turn your left, thus cutting you off from Washington."

made to believe that McClellan's whole army was in the movement."<sup>1</sup>

General Walker states that Jackson said: "I could not believe that the fire you reported indicated the advance of McClellan in force." General Walker's account of Jackson's surprised comment is even more significant. "Jackson, who was a classmate of McClellan, after a thoughtful silence, said, 'I thought I knew McClellan, but this movement of his puzzles me.'" Is there anything that could be added to show how great was this unexpected achievement of McClellan, especially when one realizes that all the time the War Department had been trying to hold him back and divert him to an imaginary defense of Washington?

As has been said, Lee had detached Jackson to capture Harper's Ferry, which became his easy prey. Halleck had insisted on keeping a garrison in this place in spite of McClellan's warning.<sup>2</sup> Jackson's capture of Harper's Ferry (September 15) gave a first appearance of success to Lee's campaign, and the news caused great exultation throughout the South. The place was of no strategic value. "It was left severely alone in the Gettysburg campaign — an admission by both sides of its uselessness as a *point d'appui*."<sup>3</sup> This is the best measure of its importance.

As was usual in the discussion of details during the first two years of the war, the capture of Harper's Ferry opened a floodgate of argument, after the campaign. The fact escaped notice that it was like the loss of a pawn in certain positions in chess — an apparent advantage to the captor, but with a Nemesis to follow. The harm done to Lee's campaign, by this diversion of Southern forces from the main objective, is not far to seek. The capture of Harper's Ferry had detached Jackson from Lee's army at the critical time of McClellan's unexpected appearance on the field. It thus helped to prevent Lee from manœuvring, because Lee could not get his army in hand.

<sup>1</sup> Walker, C. S. A. "Jackson could not believe that McClellan was before South Mountain." — Henderson.

<sup>2</sup> "The whole infantry and field artillery force of the garrison might have escaped before the 14th had General McClellan's advice of Sept. 7th and 10th been followed." — Franklin, U. S. A.

<sup>3</sup> Longstreet, C. S. A.

When McClellan suddenly appeared, the Southern forces were still separated, and Lee was forced to the alternative of taking up a defensive position, gathering his forces as soon as possible, or of retreating into Maryland. Consequently the capture of Harper's Ferry had really helped to tie Lee's hands.

The advent of McClellan's army, with Lee in this disadvantageous situation, made impossible any of the dazzling manœuvres on the part of the Southern commander, such as were successfully carried out by Lee's lieutenants in other campaigns. He could not, to use the phrase of a Southern general, "draw the enemy to a field wide enough to manœuvre; then call him to his battle!"<sup>1</sup> This time it was Lee himself who was compelled to stand and fight. This decision, which was forced upon Lee, must have been very bitter to the Confederate commander, who always preferred the offensive with freedom to manœuvre; but he was compelled to fight where he was, or concede the defeat of all his vast projects by a retreat into Southern territory.

With these great prizes before his eyes as rewards, Lee naturally chose to fight, and took up the strong position at Sharpsburg, hoping for an inferiority in the Union army or some false move that might give him success, in spite of the fact that he had been brought to bay. But this time no false move was made, and in the deadly struggle that followed the Confederate army was so battered that it was incapable of any fulfilment of Lee's dreams.

It is now self evident that, in the Antietam campaign, the only objective for the Union army was Lee's army, and McClellan fully grasped this. Later it became the fashion to say that the Army of Northern Virginia was the objective of the Army of the Potomac. But never before, nor after, was there so great a necessity to fight and cripple the Army of Northern Virginia. In September, 1862, that Army's mission carried the fate of the Confederacy.

If Lee's Army could only be forced into a battle which would halt his invasion, the cause of the Confederacy was lost. This result was accomplished by the very fact of McClellan's bringing the Union army into position across Lee's

<sup>1</sup> Longstreet, C. S. A.

path. Before studying the account of the Battle of Antietam, the reader must realize that McClellan's feat, resulting in the arrival of the Union army and forcing a battle on Lee, created a military situation which, in itself, nipped in the bud the most dangerous campaign of the Confederacy. The Count of Paris called it: "Defeat for the Confederates in the triple point of view of tactics, strategy and politics."

McClellan had forced the South Mountain range of the Blue Ridge Mountains at Crampton's Gap and Turner's Gap on September 14. This placed his army squarely across Lee's path, at a time when the whole Southern army was not in hand, because of the costly diversion of Jackson to Harper's Ferry, as described. That night Lee made his decision to stand and fight in the hope that some weakness or blunder on the Union side might still enable him to win the great results he had expected from his invasion.

On the 15th the Southern commander took up his position at Sharpsburg facing east, and in the morning of the 16th, he was joined by Jackson's own division (Jones), Ewell's, and Walker's division. Jackson was with them, and was given the command of the Confederate left. Walker's division was sent to the right, of which Longstreet had the command.

The Confederate position was very strong. The left (Jackson) rested on the Potomac, the right (Longstreet) on a bend of the Antietam Creek south of a stone bridge, which was afterwards to be known as "Burnside's Bridge." The Antietam Creek ran north and south, and all the country was difficult.

McClellan spent the 16th in reconnoissance and in arranging his army for attack. Burnside's corps had been moved over to the left, and Burnside had been given command of that wing. Hooker commanded the right wing. McClellan's plan was to attack with his right, to follow with a thrust by his left (Burnside), and to send in his centre as results might give him opportunity.

Hooker's corps (1st) had been moved across the Antietam Creek to attack the Confederate left which rested on the Potomac. McClellan in the afternoon of the 16th was on the ground with Hooker, and agreed, after a survey of the

Confederate position, that Hooker's corps, which had been weakened in the previous campaign, was not strong enough alone for the assault on the morrow.

Consequently McClellan had ordered Mansfield's (12th) corps across the Antietam to reinforce Hooker. This corps was moved over into position near Hooker in the middle of the night, but strangely enough Hooker did not make any effort to consolidate the two corps, or to arrange a combined attack by the two in the morning. It is obvious how necessary concerted action of both corps was for success.

Instead of making any use of his reinforcement, Hooker allowed the assault of his own corps to be delivered as an isolated attack soon after sunrise. The 1st Corps was so near the Southern lines that the Federal troops became involved at sunrise in desultory fighting with the enemy. Hooker followed up this skirmishing with an attack of the 1st Corps, without waiting for the support of the 12th Corps, which was so near at hand.

This attack of Hooker's Corps (1st Corps) did great damage to the Confederates, but his numbers were too small, and after heavy losses on his own part, and without support on his left where he might easily have had it, the Union troops were obliged to draw off. Hooker had been wounded in this obstinate fight and General Meade succeeded to the command of the 1st Corps.

In the meantime the 12th Corps (Mansfield), which had been at Hooker's call since the middle of the night, came to the sound of the firing, but too late to co-operate with Hooker's Corps in its battle. The 12th Corps in turn fought a damaging action with the Confederates assisted by the skilfully posted Union artillery. All authorities agree that the use of artillery by McClellan's army in this battle was most effective.

General Mansfield had been killed at the outset. His place was filled by General Williams, a brave and experienced officer. The fight was obstinately continued, and the Confederates were forced to give way. The Federals crossed the Hagerstown turnpike, and Greene's division gained and held the ground around the Dunker Church.

In these two attacks of the 1st and 12th Corps the Union

losses were great, but fully as great losses were sustained by the Confederates.

Sumner's Corps (2nd) was next in line, but the order to move this Corps was not given until 7.30 A.M. As at Fair Oaks, Sumner at once moved to reinforce the battle on his right. With Sedgwick's division he faced west and pressed forward, passing Greene's troops at the Dunker Church. Sumner's supporting division, on the left of Sedgwick's (French's), had turned more to the south, with Richardson's division on its left — thus leaving a gap and exposing to attack the left flank of Sedgwick's division at a most unfortunate time. It happened at this part of the field that the Confederate divisions of McLaws and Walker were approaching to reinforce the Southern left. Lee had been able to send this timely assistance because of the inactivity of Burnside on his right, as will be explained later.

These troops of McLaws and Walker opened fire at short range upon the exposed left flank of Sedgwick's division, which was badly cut up in a short time, and the division was forced to retire. This division reformed under cover of the Union batteries after losing nearly half of its strength.

The victorious troops of McLaws and Walker attempted to follow up their success with a counter-attack, but they in turn were also cut up and driven back by the Union artillery — McLaws losing nearly forty per cent of his strength. Here again was shown the excellent disposition of the Union artillery in this battle. The advance of the Confederates against its fire was impossible, and it should also be realized that Confederate advances against the original Union positions, which were contemplated at different times,<sup>1</sup> were given up because McClellan's batteries were so well posted.

The other two divisions of Sumner's Corps, French's and Richardson's, which, it will be remembered, had turned farther to the south when Sumner made his attack with Sedgwick's division, became involved at once in a desperate fight with the commands of D. H. Hill and Anderson. Hill's division had already suffered heavy losses in the combats with Hooker and Mansfield, but Hill had been reinforced

<sup>1</sup> Palfrey, U. S. A., etc.

by Cobb's brigade of McLaws' division. Bloody as the fighting had been on the right, it was even more desperate here. The sunken road that runs into the Hagerstown turnpike south of the Dunker Church is known to this day as "the Bloody Lane." When the Confederates were forced back this lane was filled with bodies—and finally the Southern troops fell back in great disorder, "with their morale and organization much impaired."<sup>1</sup> The Union losses were also large, but not so great as those of the enemy.

At this time Franklin came upon the ground with two divisions of the 6th Corps and was anxious to attack, but Sumner very properly advised against hazarding these fresh troops. So Franklin was not allowed to engage.

In the meantime, on the Union left it was a different story. While the fighting on the right was a succession of violent attacks, beginning with Hooker's premature thrust with his unsupported Corps, on the left Burnside remained in an apathy that is impossible to explain. His command, the Union left wing, faced the Confederate right, which lay across the Antietam. The Creek was here spanned by the stone bridge destined to bear Burnside's name. McClellan had told Burnside on the 16th that his command would be expected to cross the Antietam, and he had directed Burnside "to examine all the vicinity of the bridge, as he would probably be ordered to attack there next morning."<sup>2</sup>

Burnside was ordered to prepare for an assault at seven in the morning of the 17th, and the order to attack followed. Order after order was sent to him without effect, and finally Colonel Sackett was sent to Burnside, and he was ordered to remain until he saw that the bridge was carried—which was accomplished at about one o'clock.

Burnside had made weak attacks upon the bridge, but with characteristic ineptitude he had not even found out that the Antietam was fordable on his front. If all the harm from Burnside's delays had happened in his own part of the field, it would have been bad enough, but General Lee, "with a correct estimate of the lack of enterprise of the Union commander who opposed his right wing,"<sup>1</sup> did not

<sup>1</sup> Ropes.

<sup>2</sup> McClellan, U. S. A.

hesitate to send McLaws and Walker to reinforce his left. As has been told, the transfer of these troops to the left made possible by Burnside's inactivity, brought about the defeat of Sedgwick's division.

Burnside did not command in person his own (9th) Corps at any time in the battle, as he had turned over the command to General Cox. After carrying the bridge General Cox assaulted the Sharpsburg Heights beyond it, and at about three o'clock the Heights were also carried, but the Union troops were in turn driven back by the fresh command of A. P. Hill brought over from Harper's Ferry. The 9th Corps retired to the neighborhood of the bridge, where they "bivouacked for the night."<sup>1</sup> This ended the battle.

As might be gathered from the desperate nature of the combat, the battle of Antietam was the bloodiest day's fighting in the Civil War. The battle was a series of attacks and counter-attacks of the most deadly description. There was no attempt to take shelter by intrenching. The different commands were flung against one another in a way that was sure to entail great losses on each side. In fact the troops of both armies were fought to the point of exhaustion, with the exception of the 5th and 6th Corps, and the cavalry of the Union Army, which were held in reserve against a possible disaster in any part of the battle.

The Union losses were 11,657.<sup>2</sup> The Confederate losses 13,724.<sup>1</sup> The Union losses in killed and wounded were greater than those suffered by the Confederates — which was natural, as the Federals were the attacking army. But there was no Union loss of prisoners, and the number of Southern prisoners (approximately 6,000) accounts for the greater total of Confederate losses.<sup>3</sup>

This battle is open to the criticism common to many battles where attacks have been made along an enemy's front — there was not enough co-ordination in the attacks. Waterloo is an example of this; Malvern Hill and Gettysburg are notable instances of such battles in the Civil War.

<sup>1</sup> Ropes.

<sup>2</sup> Livermore, U. S. A., *Numbers and Losses*.

<sup>3</sup> 13 guns, 39 Colors, upwards of 15,000 stand of small arms and more than 6,000 prisoners. — McClellan, U. S. A. report.

For this McClellan, as commander-in-chief, must bear the blame, but he was unfortunate in the unexpected conduct of his two lieutenants, Hooker and Burnside. Both of these officers had soldierly qualities, but the later history of the war proved that both were deficient in the qualities needed to direct large bodies of troops in action.

The exhausted armies were in no condition to renew the struggle on the next day. Although Lee could not bear to give up his great objects, it was evident that a renewal of the battle on the part of the battered Confederate army was out of the question.<sup>1</sup>

The Federal army had been reinforced on the forenoon of the 18th by the divisions of Couch and Humphreys and the wisdom of a new Union assault is more open to debate. But was there any result to be gained that would be worth the inevitable losses, and worth the risk of some mischance? The main object of the campaign had been accomplished. Lee's army was crippled, and his invasion ended. It is more probable that there was greater risk of loss than possibility of additional gain for McClellan.

On the Confederate side Lee, who clung to the last hope, was finally persuaded by the generals of his broken army that his case was hopeless—and the Southern army retreated across the Potomac into Virginia in the night of the 18th. Its objects in America and Europe had been defeated—the North had parried the most dangerous blow of the war.

The size of Lee's army in his first invasion of the North has been usually understated, even to a greater degree than the common habit of giving the minimum strength of a Confederate army.<sup>2</sup> Many ardent writers, over-anxious to give Lee credit for his bold move, have cut his numbers down to a point that would make his invasion an act of folly. They forget that justice to Lee demands the recognition of a sound military plan of invasion, not of a raid with numbers insufficient to accomplish a military result. It is the reverse of praising Lee, to say that he invaded the North with 50,000 men. On the contrary, Lee realized his great

<sup>1</sup> "This was found to be out of the question."—Ropes.

<sup>2</sup> Grant, etc.

opportunity to gain decisive results, and brought into his campaign an army strong enough to win success, if he had not been forced into a premature battle by McClellan.<sup>1</sup>

It is very rarely that the size of a Confederate army can be determined from official figures. As was to be expected, most of the Southern records were lost or in great confusion. But it happens that there is in existence an official field return of the Army of Northern Virginia which proves beyond a doubt that Lee's army of invasion was much larger than the usual estimate.

This return is here given.

ABSTRACT FROM FIELD RETURNS OF THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,  
COMMANDED BY GEN. ROBERT E. LEE, FOR SEPTEMBER 22 (1862):

Command	Present for duty Offs.	Enlisted Men	Aggregate present
Longstreet's Corps			
General Staff .....	11		11
McLaws' division .....	269	3,659	4,018
Jones' division .....	350	3,460	4,403
Anderson's division .....	389	4,935	6,298
Walker's division .....	221	3,207	3,871
Hood's division .....	255	2,592	2,847
Evans' brigade .....	40	516	556
Lee's & Walton bat. of art. ....	39	632	677
TOTAL .....	1574	19,001	22,681
Jackson's Corps			
D. H. Hill's division .....	332	4,739	5,821
A. P. Hill's division .....	342	4,435	5,468
Ewell's division .....	298	3,144	4,066
Jackson's own division .....	186	2,367	3,484
TOTAL .....	1158	14,685	18,830
GRAND TOTAL .....	2732	33,686	41,520

Note on Original Return.—This return is very imperfect, the cavalry and reserve artillery not being reported. *War Records*, XIX. 2. 621.

This return was made before Lee had been reinforced, and before he had recovered any of the stragglers which he had lost in the Antietam campaign. On the contrary, as Lee himself wrote on the very day before this return, the

<sup>1</sup> "Gen. Lee recognized the fact that his plans had been thwarted by this premature engagement."—Walker, C. S. A.

Army of Northern Virginia had continued to lose strength from "this evil which has increased instead of diminished."<sup>1</sup> In fact, so alarming had become these continued defections from straggling, that again on September 23, the day after this return, Lee wrote to the Confederate Secretary of War that "unless something is done the army will melt away."

Consequently Lee's own words, written at the time, make it certain that the equivalent of every man "present for duty" in the above field return of September 22, had been in the invasion of Maryland, and every such man must have been in Lee's army on the day of Antietam. This is understating the case — for there had been no accessions but many defections after the battle.

Taking the bare total of "present for duty" September 22 we	
have .....	36,418
Adding Reserve Artillery (less losses) <sup>2</sup> ..	912
and Cavalry (less losses) <sup>3</sup> .....	5,761
Losses at South Mountain .....	1,885
Losses at Antietam .....	13,724
<hr/>	
TOTAL .....	58,700

This total of 58,700 must have been in the invasion, as every man is accounted for — being "present for duty," or among the losses in battle. But this total does not include Lee's losses by straggling, which all authorities agree were very large. The demoralization and losses of the Army of Northern Virginia from straggling will be more fully considered later, but it can be said with certainty that these stragglers could not have been less than 10,000. The number was probably even greater.

From these premises, which are true beyond a doubt, we are forced to the conclusion that Lee must have had an army of over 65,000 for his invasion of the North. Longstreet, in his book, admits that Lee's army was "slightly over 61,000."

As to Lee's army at the Battle of Antietam, even conceding that he had lost every straggler before the battle —

<sup>1</sup> Lee, C. S. A., to Davis, September 21, 1862. *War Records*, XIX, Pt. I. 142.

<sup>2</sup> Livermore.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

which is out of the question — these figures prove that Lee must have had at least 56,815 effectives on the day of the battle. This will be seen at once when we realize that the first total of 58,700 must have been in Lee's army September 17, with the exception of the losses at South Mountain. These were 1885, and taking these losses from the total of 58,700 gives 56,815 men who must have been in Lee's army on September 17th, the day of the Battle of Antietam. Of course the fact that numerous stragglers who were lost after the battle makes it certain that Lee's effectives exceeded this number, but these figures, which cannot be disputed, show the folly of the erroneous statements of Lee's strength which have been given wide credence.

No one can blame a good old Confederate for making the odds between the armies as large as possible. Yet a statement giving the Confederate strength as 35,255<sup>1</sup> becomes a joke, when the simple subtraction of only the losses in the Battle of Antietam (13,724) would have left Lee with the total of 21,531. In view of the existence of this official return what could be more ridiculous? Yet this was a sample of war-time enthusiastic writing.

Lee himself gave color to these tales by saying that the battle was fought by less than forty thousand men on the Southern side — evidently accepting the versions of his lieutenants, A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill, Hood, McLaws, Jones, etc., each of whom seemed to try to make out his own command a mere skeleton, and to make no attempt to reconcile such statements with the actual official figures.

But what can be said of a recent "historian" like Henderson, who calmly gives Lee 41,000 at Antietam? The same deadly subtraction of the losses in the battle would leave Lee about as badly off as at Appomattox! Henderson also distinguished himself by classing Antietam as a Confederate victory — a victory that defeated Lee's whole campaign!

Nothing could be more misleading than such statements of Confederate numbers. Yet these obviously incorrect figures have been seized upon to give point to arguments about the battle. Even such an earnest historian as Ropes "thought best in the text"<sup>2</sup> to adhere to his estimate that

<sup>1</sup> Taylor, C. S. A., *Four Years with General Lee*.

<sup>2</sup> Ropes, *The Campaigns of 1862*.

“the Confederate infantry . . . did not exceed 31,200 men or thereabout. Adding the Confederate cavalry and artillery . . . we have a total of 39,200 men.” Yet in a note to his chapter on the Battle of Antietam, Ropes computes from the return of September 22, and arrives at “a total of 58,000 men present for duty on the morning of the battle” — a strange case of an able historian so imbued with an idea that he must retain it in his text, even after it had been proved untrue and he had been obliged to make the correction in a note.

McClellan in his report had gone to the other extreme, in contrast to Lee, and had given his total strength (“on paper”) of 87,164. This was seized upon, and used by various writers as if it had really been a report of effectives. Palfrey calls it “the famous total in action on which Southern writers to this day ring the changes as if it were absolutely true.” The mythical “three to one” version had so taken possession of many prejudiced minds that it was necessary to try at least for a two to one basis. Even this is no longer tenable.

It is a strange fact in regard to the Battle of Antietam, the most misunderstood and most misstated battle of the war, that there should be for once definite official figures which put the matter of Confederate numbers beyond dispute. Yet they exist as matters of official record, and there is no getting away from these deadly figures, which prove that all former estimates made on any other basis were worthless.

Colonel Livermore in his *Numbers and Losses in the Civil War* did not fall into any of these errors. In his first table he arrived at 51,844 effectives — in his second 59,284. This author’s careful estimates of numbers are probably more reliable than any other’s, and Livermore gives the Union effectives as 75,316, which should be accepted as very close to the true total. These figures of Confederate and Federal strength at once put the conditions of the battle on the right basis, and they show that the attacking Union army had no overwhelming superiority, which would make it stronger than the superiority in numbers recognized as a necessary condition for an attack.

In one respect, this was the most extraordinary battle of

the Civil War — and one of the most extraordinary in all military history. It would be hard to find an action where the tactical result in the field was so small, and yet the strategic result was so important. At Antietam the Confederate army was barely driven back from its positions, but the actual military results made it the most decisive battle of the whole war. In reality it was the turning point of the war.

In this campaign a Confederate invasion was defeated that was undertaken with high prospects of success, and this invasion was the greatest menace to the North in the whole war. Its dangers have been explained—in fact it was the culminating effort of the original military superiority of the South,<sup>1</sup> the one break through that meant a possible Southern victory in the Civil War. When Lee's army retreated into Virginia depleted and demoralized, it meant the end of all this. Antietam was the "High Tide"—not Gettysburg. From this time on the great resources of the North inexorably asserted themselves, and the South was sure to be defeated.

Of course it was not evident at the time that Antietam was the turning point of the war, but even the accounts that are full of hostile criticism of McClellan plainly show the stunning shock of this unexpected disaster to the Confederacy.<sup>2</sup>

This is most frequent in Southern writings and in Southern official documents, showing beyond any doubt the complete overturn of all the Confederate hopes. Longstreet wrote: "The razing of the walls of Jericho was scarcely a greater miracle than the transformation of the conquering army of the South into a horde of disordered fugitives before an army that two weeks earlier was flying to cover." It was this demoralization of the Army of Northern Virginia that was the strongest evidence of the extent of their disaster. Their men had got out of control and had straggled from the ranks in great numbers. Lee wrote to the Confederate Secretary of War of "the woeful diminution of the present

<sup>1</sup> "After this date (September 1862) a strong offensive with any chance of success was never undertaken by the enemy."—Dodge, U. S. A.

<sup>2</sup> It is not therefore an exaggeration to say that he saved the "Northern Cause."—Childe, C. S. A.

for duty in this army. The absent are scattered broadcast over the land.”<sup>1</sup> The Confederate official correspondence also shows that the Southern troops committed depredations, threw away their arms, and threw away their shoes to escape duty<sup>2</sup> — a great change in two weeks for the conquerors of Pope. In fact this disastrous campaign of two weeks brought demoralization and loss of morale to the Army of Northern Virginia for the only time in its history. Even when this Confederate army was wasting away in the last months of the war its morale was better than just after Antietam.

In the North the President's tribute was impressive. Lincoln said: “When Lee was driven out of Maryland I promised my God I would abolish slavery,”<sup>3</sup> and the Emancipation Proclamation was at once issued which put the war on the right basis here and abroad. The importance of the Emancipation Proclamation, in its moral and physical effect on the Civil War, cannot be exaggerated. At home and abroad it at once gave the United States Government a moral strength that exerted a strong military effect upon the war. Moral forces have been proved of great military value, and for the United States it was at least in reality “The Battle Cry of Freedom!” From this time the war was won. The break through of the South had been beaten back, and, as has been explained, the Friends of Freedom in Great Britain had been made dominant by this visible object for the Northern cause in the Civil War.

Yet, although this defeat of Lee's plan in the Antietam campaign had for the first time in the war made the United States strong enough to enact this measure, and although there had been a great sense of relief from danger throughout the North, no sooner was the danger over than the same influences were set to work upon Lincoln, under cover of the same impatient demand that something should be done at once.

The Army of the Potomac had been exhausted by two hard campaigns, and was in no condition to take the field

<sup>1</sup> Lee to Randolph, September 23, 1862. *War Records*, XIX. 2, 622.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, XIX. 2, 617, 618, 629.

<sup>3</sup> James Freeman Clarke.

at once. It has been a recognized axiom that there is a time, after such exhausting service, when an army must be given a rest, to provide a chance to rebound from the strain that has been endured. The Army of the Potomac was then at this stage,<sup>1</sup> and it would have been unreasonable to call upon its personnel for another effort at once. On the other hand, it was not realized that the Army of the Potomac had accomplished the one necessary military result of so smashing and battering Lee's army that it had destroyed all powers of offensive for the Army of Northern Virginia at the crisis of the Civil War, when the South must win an offensive or lose the war.

It must again be emphasized that this result of destroying the Confederate offense was the logical object for the North in 1862. The resultant enforced inactivity was all to the disadvantage of the South — not to the disadvantage of the North, as the Northern forces were being gathered to hem in the South.

For these reasons the impatient clamor in the North was not justified. But the complaints were persistent enough to undermine Lincoln's confidence, and on the eve of another campaign McClellan was relieved, and Burnside was made Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Potomac — one of the most inexcusable blunders of the Civil War.

All that can be said in excuse, is that the North was still at the impatient stage of the war, and this impatience was used as a means to an end by the element that unfortunately dominated the War Department. With Stanton as Secretary and Halleck as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, there was no guiding wisdom. These very men, who had given up Washington as lost and vainly tried to hold McClellan back from his march against Lee, again interfered, after the situation had been saved, and handed over the Army of the Potomac to incompetents and disaster.

Longstreet's words described the benefits for the South of this costly error of the Northern Administration: "The

<sup>1</sup> "He had under him many troops, and his best . . . were exhausted by labours such as critics oftener impeach than perform. In almost all campaigns a similar criticism may be passed, — after the event. There is always a term to the endurance and activity of armies and their commanders." — Dodge, U. S. A.

*change* was a good lift for the South, however; McClellan was growing, was likely to exhibit far greater powers than he had yet shown, and could not have given us opportunity to recover the morale lost at Sharpsburg as did Burnside and Hooker." The same thing was even more forcibly expressed by General Palfrey, and this was most striking because it came from one of the severe Northern critics of McClellan: "Not to mention such lamentable failures as Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, it is easy to believe that with him in command, the Army of the Potomac would never have seen such dark days as those of the Wilderness and Cold Harbor."<sup>1</sup>

For the choice of Pope, plainly unsuited to command though he was, there was at least the prestige of a military success; but it is hard to find any excuse for Stanton's and Halleck's successive choices of Burnside and Hooker to command the Army of the Potomac. Both had already shown unmistakably their inability to command large bodies of men, which afterwards brought on the tragedies of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville.

The Northern public was destined many times to see far longer delays forced upon the Army of the Potomac to repair defeats. And under Meade and Grant, the North was compelled to learn from long and bitter experience the real meaning of the phrase, so often used, "to capture or destroy Lee's army." Yet, even after these object lessons, there were many wartime writers who claimed that McClellan should have accomplished the one or the other in the Antietam campaign. It can now be said that the critics, who held that Lee's army should have been captured or destroyed at Antietam, are nearly extinct. The lessons of warfare have shown that Antietam was not a military situation where complete destruction of an army was probable. This was an army in the field, well commanded by Lee and his able lieutenants. There were no possibilities of enveloping or converging forces, that would have hemmed in and prevented Lee from withdrawing his army when too hard pressed.

In the wartime writings, and for years after the Civil

<sup>1</sup> *Antietam and Fredericksburg.*

war, the capture of an important order of General Lee's, showing the disposition of the Southern forces, has been made the reason for this claim that Lee's army should have been destroyed. This "Lost Order" discussion, like many other disputes over the details of tactics of different operations, has clouded the broad issues in the crisis. Even if a more prompt push forward of the Union forces through the passes had been made and McClellan's army had attacked earlier, when Jackson's force was detached, is there much probability that greater damage would have been done to Lee's army than in the actual battle? Why should we assume that, in case of an earlier attack, Lee would have stood his ground and allowed his army to be overwhelmed in detail? To put the Confederate army to flight, would have been no military result that could compare in value with the disabling losses that were suffered in the Antietam battle.

The point which was missed was the fact that, as the battle was actually fought, Lee gathered his army for a desperate effort to win the objects of his invasion. He hoped for some good fortune that would gain victory, in spite of the fact that he was pinned down to a premature battle in a position where he could not manœuvre. This involved Lee's whole army in a losing battle, in which it was so shattered and demoralized that it could fight no more. He was compelled to give up all his ambitions, and the battle had crippled his army. It is hard to find anything worse that could have happened to the Southern General, even if his army had been forced to retreat by an earlier attack. The fact, in itself, that he was emboldened to stand and fight was the best military result for the North. Not only were the objects of Lee's invasion defeated, but the Army of Northern Virginia had sustained the greatest losses of its career.

On the other hand, in case there had been a more hurried movement of the Union Army, the chances of some disaster to the Northern forces must be kept in mind. It was no time for taking the slightest chance of getting the army out of hand, or for allowing the possibility of a part being cut up through some blunder. This was one occasion when

careful preparation was most essential — as there would have been no other defense left for the North, if there had been a disaster for the Army of the Potomac in this campaign. This possibility should be left out of the question, the crisis was too grave. A sure solution of the problem was the only one permitted in this case.

In this great emergency, it must be recognized, McClellan's difficult problem was to defeat Lee's dangerous offensive with a Union army that had just been badly beaten, and was thought paralyzed for the time by the Southern commander. McClellan found the one correct solution, not to be held back by Washington, not to be diverted into any side issues, but to bring the Northern army at its full strength upon Lee's army so far ahead of all Confederate calculations, that he forced Lee to fight the premature battle at Antietam. This premature battle forced upon Lee was the one way to beat back the invasion, and no other chance should have been taken. Fortunately McClellan played the sure game, and Lee's army was forced back into Southern soil. Here was the crisis of the war, and upon McClellan's conduct of this campaign under every disadvantage, and the great result to the Northern cause, the verdict of impartial history will be beyond dispute.<sup>1</sup>

Strangely enough, the Antietam campaign also had its parallel later in the war, like McClellan's problem of the Seven Days, although the ground was not the same, as was Grant's at Gaines' Mill. The Gettysburg campaign found the Union army again opposing an invasion of the North. It is true that Lee's second invasion implied no such menace as his first. In 1863 there was no hope of foreign intervention, no invitation for Davis to join the Southern army on Northern soil.

In contrast to the Confederate invasion of 1862, Lee's Gettysburg campaign was a desperate raid to bolster up Confederate credit. Vicksburg was at its last gasp,<sup>2</sup> and

<sup>1</sup> "We feel convinced that impartial history will render justice to the really extraordinary results he obtained through his activity, the precision of his orders, and the prestige of his name, in leading to the pursuit of a victorious enemy the routed bands he had rallied in sight of the capital." — Comte de Paris.

<sup>2</sup> Vicksburg surrendered July 4, 1863.

the greater strength of the North had become evident. Lee's campaign reflected these conditions. In contrast to his first invasion, he seemed to have had no definite plans, apparently thinking his only chance of success lay in some blunder of his opponent. It is hard to explain the Gettysburg campaign on any other grounds.

After his defeat at Gettysburg, Lee again withdrew his army into Virginia, just as he had done before after Antietam, and again he was able to retreat without interference. But, this time, although there was friction between Meade and the Administration, there was no arbitrary removal from the command. The Northern public had learned that there were worse evils than "delays."

If we put aside all the political and controversial part of our Civil War histories, and think only of the broad military situations and military events of 1862, the conviction is forced upon us that McClellan was a most necessary man at the time. In fact he possessed the abilities that the time required. The actual tests of war for Halleck, Pope, Burnside, and Hooker, certainly proved that there was no one else at hand who could have averted disaster in these two fateful emergencies, when McClellan was called upon to act.

The qualities in McClellan, which were most criticised, were his caution, his excessive care in preparation, and his "slow" operations and "delays." He undoubtedly laid himself open to these criticisms. But it must be remembered that he was called to command at the early impatient stage of the war, when the North did not realize its great tasks, and was clamoring for quick results. Now that we realize the impossibility of an immediate military conquest of the South, we are obliged to form a very different estimate of the cost to the North of the initial "delays." Knowing the need of gathering the forces of the North, before the first advantage of the South could be overcome, it is now evident that the time spent in organizing the army could not have been so well utilized in any other way.

Yet it was the exasperation caused by the "delays" in organization that aroused the hostility to McClellan. It is now clear that the organization of the Army of the Potomac was accomplished in a wonderfully short time, and

this unprecedented task was performed in such a thorough manner that the Army of the Potomac maintained its organization and morale, even throughout the fearful blunders of McClellan's successors in command.

The outstanding fact cannot be ignored that McClellan did not blunder himself, and, in either of his two campaigns of 1862, a blunder would have been fatal, so great was the emergency for the North in each case. This has been overlooked in the impatience caused by McClellan's "slow" movements. In the Peninsula campaign, it is now known, McClellan's army was never for a day strong enough to take Richmond against the forces defending the city. Yet "caution" and "delays" were hastily assumed to have prevented the accomplishment of some miracle by the Army of the Potomac.

Of course, the truth was, it was not a question of the days or weeks taken for the operations. It was a question of giving McClellan enough troops in the Peninsula—and these were denied him to the end. On the other hand, when Lee's concentration against McClellan was permitted to take place without sending reinforcements to McClellan, and the Army of the Potomac was in grave danger of destruction, McClellan rose to the emergency and saved his army in the brilliant movement by the left to the James.

It was the same story in the Antietam campaign. McClellan's immediate move against Lee was the only possible means for averting a crisis in the war. McClellan made this quick decision against all opinion of the War Department, which tried to hold him back from its execution. McClellan put his army in Lee's path weeks before Lee thought it possible, and decisively defeated the Confederate invasion. Yet again the question of a day here or a day there was allowed to blur the issue.

It can truly be said, with all due acknowledgment of his faults, that the very qualities in McClellan which were most criticised, were the ones most needed at the first of the war against the fresh and vigorous South. His completeness of preparation and sound strategy were essential. His "delays" gave the Army of the Potomac an organization that stood the test throughout the Civil War. In the Peninsula

campaign his skill fought off the full strength of the Confederacy, when there was no chance for Union success. In the Antietam campaign he defeated the only dangerous offensive of the South, acting with an energy and decision that showed the sound strategic sense that lay underneath his "delays," "overpreparation," and "engineer tactics" — all of which were catch words in the first controversies that followed the events.

Studies of the actual military facts show that, in the two fighting emergencies of McClellan's career, his decisions were two of the boldest of the war — the move by the left to the James in the Peninsula Campaign, and the move to place the Union Army in front of Lee at Antietam. Each of these accomplished the unexpected and disconcerting result of placing Lee in a position where this most resourceful of Southern generals was unable to manœuvre. Lee never forgot these two unexpected defeats for his plans, and Lee's own words are unmistakable. "I asked him (General Lee) which of the Federal commanders he considered the greatest, and he answered most emphatically, 'McClellan by all odds.'"<sup>1</sup>

This does not mean that Lee challenged, for instance, the recognition that Sherman had won in the Civil War. But this was the enforced tribute paid by the brilliant Southern leader to the one general whose sound strategy had reduced Lee's brilliancy to commonplace lack of success. This is a phase of the strategy of the Civil War that has never been sufficiently understood. It has been widely acknowledged that, with Lee and his group of lieutenants, the Confederates at the outset had military leadership that has seldom been equaled. The personnel throughout the Southern forces was also unusual. It would be hard to find in history a like case of military forces suddenly called into being with the best leaders in command from the very first.

The natural result was a brilliant showing at first for Lee and his generals, in contrast with slower development of Northern leadership. Yet one fact stands out so plainly that it cannot be mistaken. The bold and dazzling manœuvres of the leaders of the Army of Northern Virginia

<sup>1</sup> Casanove Lee in *Biography of General Lee*, by R. E. Lee, Jr.

were effective against men of the stamp of Pope and Hooker. Against McClellan, in both campaigns of 1862, they fell down completely.

Lee's bringing Jackson from the Shenandoah Valley for his concentration against McClellan in the peninsula was one of his most brilliant conceptions. Against the incompetents in the Valley, Jackson had shone like a destructive meteor. But it certainly was a great contrast, to find Lee and Jackson themselves the bewildered ones in the Seven Days, unable to understand McClellan's move by the left, and doubtful which way to turn. If Jackson had been judged only by his performance in the Seven Days, would his early post-war reputation have been so exaggerated?

Again, in the Antietam campaign, Lee's plan was startlingly bold, with greatest promise of success over a wide field of manœuvre. Yet, in two weeks, Lee was pinned down to a cramped and premature battle. Where were the brilliant manœuvres of Lee and Jackson, against this solution of the problem by McClellan?

It is no wonder that the early hasty judgment of Civil War leaders has been revised. These are military facts — not arguments in controversy — and they show beyond doubt that McClellan neutralized Lee in 1862. This does not imply that McClellan was a Napoleon, but it is now evident that, just after the war, there was a prevailing habit of over-estimating Lee and under-estimating McClellan. The Northern General, who twice baffled Lee in 1862, must at least be recognized as the right kind of a general for 1862.

There is another side of McClellan's two campaigns of 1862 that has not been appreciated, the amount of damage done to the Army of Northern Virginia. Outside of the great wastage which has been explained, the actual battle losses of the Army of Northern Virginia were over 44,000.<sup>1</sup> This was such a severe drain, that, even with all the resources of the Confederate conscription, Lee's army never again approached the strength that it was able to bring into the field at the be-

<sup>1</sup> Confederate battle losses in McClellan's two campaigns of 1862: Williamsburg, 1,703; Seven Pines (Fair Oaks), 6,134; Seven Days, 20,614; Antietam Campaign, 15,609; total, 44,060. Livermore, *Numbers and Losses*.

ginning of the Seven Days. When these losses have been summed up, it is easy to understand why there was no danger of a Confederate offensive after the "horror of Fredericksburg."<sup>1</sup>

Consequently, when regarded from the point of view of those who held that hard fighting, and inflicting heavy losses on the Confederates, should have been the most important essential of Northern strategy, McClellan's campaigns of 1862 are beyond comparison. There were no other campaigns in the Civil War where so great proportionate damage was done to the Southern forces.

But the real measure of the value of McClellan to the Union is summed up in the fact that his services covered the period of danger to the North. His skill neutralized the original military advantage of the South, and he beat off the full offensive strength of the Confederacy. A disaster in either one of his campaigns would have been ruinous, but under McClellan's command all danger of Southern success was ended. In the words of Colonel Dodge: "After this date (September 1862) a strong offensive with any chance of success was never undertaken by the enemy."

Remarks were made during the meeting by Messrs. SCHAFF, A. B. HART, NORCROSS, J. C. WARREN and DOWSE.

<sup>1</sup> Dodge, U. S. A.